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Abstract
An underlying assumption of Stackelberg Games (SGs) is perfect ra-
tionality of the players. However, in real-life situations (which are often
modeled by SGs) the followers (terrorists, thieves, poachers or smugglers)
– as humans in general – may act not in a perfectly rational way, as
their decisions may be affected by biases of various kinds which bound
rationality of their decisions. One of the popular models of bounded ra-
tionality (BR) is Anchoring Theory (AT) which claims that humans have
a tendency to flatten probabilities of available options, i.e. they perceive
a distribution of these probabilities as being closer to the uniform distri-
bution than it really is. This paper proposes an efficient formulation of
AT in sequential extensive-form SGs (named ATSG), suitable for Mixed-
Integer Linear Program (MILP) solution methods. ATSG is implemented
in three MILP/LP-based state-of-the-art methods for solving sequential
SGs and two recently introduced non-MILP approaches: one relying on
Monte Carlo sampling (O2UCT ) and the other one (EASG) employing
Evolutionary Algorithms. Experimental evaluation indicates that both
non-MILP heuristic approaches scale better in time than MILP solutions
while providing optimal or close-to-optimal solutions. Except for compet-
itive time scalability, an additional asset of non-MILP methods is flexi-
bility of potential BR formulations they are able to incorporate. While
MILP approaches accept BR formulations with linear constraints only, no
restrictions on the BR form are imposed in either of the two non-MILP
methods.
1 Introduction
Stackelberg Games (SGs) [15, 27] are a game-theoretic model which attracted
considerable interest in recent years, in particular in Security Games area [26].
In its simplest form Stackelberg Security Game (SSG) assumes two players: a
leader who commits to a (mixed) strategy first, and a follower who makes their
commitment already knowing decision of the leader. The above asymmetry
of the players very well corresponds to interactions between law enforcement
forces (leaders) and smugglers, terrorists or poachers (followers) modeled by
SSGs [6, 7, 33, 24].
A fundamental assumption in SGs is that the follower will make an optimal,
perfectly rational decision exploiting knowledge about the leader’s commitment.
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However, in real-life scenarios the follower may suffer from cognitive biases or
bounded rationality leading them to suboptimal decisions [32, 20, 6].
On a general note, bounded rationality (BR) [25] in problem-solving refers
to limitations of decision-makers that lead them to taking non-optimal actions.
Except for limited cognitive abilities, BR can be attributed to partial knowledge
about the problem, limited resources, or imprecisely defined goal [1, 23]. The
most popular models of BR are Prospect Theory (PT) [8], Anchoring Theory
(AT) [28], Quantal Response (QR) [17] and Framing Effect (FE) [29]. Each of
these models has specific problem-related assumptions and each of them pos-
sesses certain experimental justification, though none of them could be regarded
as a widely-agreeable leading BR formulation.
The concept of BR plays an important role in SSGs, as in their real-world
applications the follower’s role is played by humans, e.g. terrorists, poachers or
criminals, who usually suffer from BR limitations. One of the most popular BR
approaches in SSG domain is COBRA [20, 21] which modifies DOBSS MILP
(Mixed-Integer Linear Program) [19] to address AT with -optimality models.
A similar approach was taken by Yang et al. [32] who proposed BR models rely-
ing on PT and QR, resp. and demonstrated their suitability in SSGs based on
experiments involving humans. SHARP system [9] points certain game-related
aspects (e.g. past performance, similarity between game conditions, etc.) which
need to be taken into account by an algorithm for repeated SSGs when play-
ing against human adversaries. MATCH approach [22] optimizes the leader’s
strategy against a worst-case outcome within some error bound (i.e. assuming
certain deviations from the follower’s optimal strategy). Another approach -
BRQR [31] proposed by Yang et al. is based on the idea of QR, further im-
proved in SU-BRQR system [18] which introduces a subjective utility function
for the follower with parameters tuned in the experiments involving humans.
Despite clear variability, all existing implementations of BR in SSG domain em-
ploy MILP for finding the game solution (Stackelberg Equilibrium) and all of
them are limited to one-step (non-sequential) games.
In this paper, AT approach implemented in COBRA [20, 21] for single-step
normal-form games is extended to the case of sequential extensive-form games in
a way that avoids non-linear constraints, which makes it suitable for a wide range
of MILP/LP approaches. Consequently, modifications to three state-of-the-art
methods for solving extensive-form SSGs [4, 5, 2] which implement AT are
proposed. Furthermore, two other non-MILP heuristic methods for solving SSG
that rely on Monte Carlo sampling [11, 13] and Evolutionary Algorithm [34],
respectively are also adequately modified to incorporate AT principles. All five
methods are experimentally evaluated on a set of Warehouse Games [10, 16].
1.1 Definitions
Throughout the paper a notation from [4] will be used so as to easily refer to
the method proposed in that paper. Sequential games will be represented as
Extensive-Form Games (EFGs), i.e. tuples G = (N ,H,Z,A, ρ, u, I), where
N = {l, f} is a set of players, the leader and the follower respectively. H is a
set of game nodes which compose a game tree with a root node representing
the initial game position. Z ⊂ H is a set of leaves representing terminal game
states. A is a family of sets Ah, which ∀h ∈ H \ Z define possible actions
from each non-terminal node. ρ : H \ Z → N is a function that defines an
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acting player in a given node. u = {ul, uf}, ui : Z → R, i ∈ N is a family of
utility functions that assign a game outcome in a terminal node to the respective
player. I is a family of Information Sets (ISs); each I ∈ I defines states that
are indistinguishable to the acting player. I satisfies the following conditions:
• I partitions H \ Z,
• ∀I ∈ I ∀h1, h2 ∈ I ρ(h1) = ρ(h2) – all nodes in a given IS have the
same acting player,
• ∀I ∈ I ∀h1, h2 ∈ I Ah1 = Ah2 – the set of possible actions is the same
for all nodes from a given IS.
Additionally, A(I) will denote the set of actions available in I and Ii, i ∈ N a
family of ISs with acting player i (I = Il ∪ If ).
Moreover, the games are assumed to satisfy the perfect recall property, i.e.
throughout the game each player is fully aware of previous ISs visited by them
and actions taken in that ISs.
In EFG a pure strategy of a player assigns to each IS in which the player is
an acting one a particular action to be played in that IS. A mixed strategy of
a player is a probability distribution over pure strategies of that player. Πi /
∆i will denote a set of pure / mixed strategies of player i, resp. Elements of Πi
and ∆i will be denoted by pi and δ with adequate indices, resp.
A behavior strategy is an assignment of a probability distribution of actions
for each IS that a player can reach during the game. It can be viewed as a tree
with nodes representing player’s ISs and edges representing actions (labeled with
their probabilities). The notions of mixed strategy and behavior strategy will be
used interchangeably as they are equivalent in games with perfect recall.
We will overload the notation of u functions, so that ui(pil, pif ) would de-
note the i-th player’s utility after the pure strategy profile (pil, pif ) was played.
Similarly, ui(δl, δf ) will denote the expected utility value of the i-th player in
reference to the mixed strategy profile (δl, δf ).
Each node in a game tree is uniquely defined by a pair of sequences: the
leader’s actions and the follower’s actions which lead to that node. These se-
quences will be denoted by σl and σf , resp. We will say that a pair of sequences
(σl, σf ) is compatible if it leads to a terminal node in a game tree. Utility values
in terminal nodes pointed by a compatible pair of sequences will be denoted
by ui(σl, σf ), i ∈ N . Following [4], for any pair (σl, σf ) we will define an aux-
iliary function gi(σl, σf ) which yields a value of ui(σl, σf ) if the sequences are
compatible and 0 otherwise.
Finally, σi(h), i ∈ N , h ∈ H will denote a sequence of moves of the i-th
player which led to node h and Ii(σi) the IS in which the last action from σi
was played.
The goal of SG is to find Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE), i.e. a strategy profile
(δl, δf ) that is a solution of the following set of equations:{
maxδl ul(δl, BR(δl))
BR(δl) = argmaxδfuf (δl, δf )
(1)
Please observe that SE is not well defined when there is more than one best
follower’s response. For this reason SE is often extended to the form of Strong
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Stackelberg Equilibirum (SSE) [3] in which, in addition to (1), in the case of a
tie among follower’s best response strategies, the of them that maximizes the
leader’s utility is selected (if there are more such strategies anyone of them is
chosen). The SSE version of SE is considered in this paper.
1.2 Motivation
The paper combines the following two concepts, which are generally considered
separately in the literature: (1) bounded rationality models in Security Games
and (2) efficient solutions for sequential SGs. In both areas significant progress
has been observed in recent years.
To our knowledge, the concept of BR has been addressed in Security Games
only in the context of single-step games, for instance, in the recently emerged,
fast-growing genre of Green Security Games [30, 6], in which game theoretical
models exploit not rational behavior of attackers (e.g. poachers or illegal forest
extractors) to maximize the effectiveness of protection activities.
At the same time, in reference to large-scale sequential SGs, several algo-
rithms utilizing different techniques, e.g. sequence-form [2], correlated equilib-
ria [4], game abstraction [5], Evolutionary Algorithm [12, 34] or Monte Carlo
sampling [10, 13] which visibly extended the range of tractable SGs, have been
proposed recently.
We believe that successful studies on the crossroads of these two research
directions will allow for tackling large-scale problems that better (more realis-
tically) model security situations involving humans.
Among several BR models introduced in the literature, we have chosen the
AT approach since it was already successfully applied to single-step SGs [20] and,
furthermore, is intuitively justified in the cases when only limited observation
of the leader’s strategy is possible.
Generally speaking, AT [28] assumes the existence of a bias of a person who
observes some events (for instance, surveils the opponent’s strategy in SSG)
towards the uniform distribution. Formally, for any probability distribution
over a finite set X, let us denote the probability of x ∈ X as qx. The observer
believes that this probability is equal to q′x = qx(1−α)+α/|X|, where 0 < α < 1
is a parameter of AT bias and |X| is cardinality of X.
In SGs the leader, being aware of the follower’s AT bias, can exploit this
knowledge in their mixed strategy formulation.
1.3 Contribution
The main contribution of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• Introduction of efficient MILP-suitable extension of Anchoring Theory to
the genre of sequential (multi-step) Stackelberg Games (ATSG);
• Implementation of ATSG in three MILP/LP-based state-of-the-art meth-
ods for solving sequential Stackelberg Games (two exact and one approx-
imate) and in two approximate non-MILP approaches, relying on Monte
Carlo sampling and Evolutionary Algorithm, respectively;
• Experimental evaluation of five above-mentioned methods in BR settings
with respect to the quality of payoffs and time efficiency.
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2 Anchoring Theory in Sequential Games
As we mentioned above, implementations of AT in SGs presented in the litera-
ture are limited to single-step games only. There are two straightforward ways
to generalize AT to sequential games.
The first one is to transform an extensive-form game to its normal-form
where each player’s actions are equivalent to pure strategies. Such an approach,
however, would introduce a global distortion of probabilities and is, therefore, in-
accurate when the opponent’s behavior is considered separately in each decision
point.
The other possibility is to apply AT distortion locally - i.e. to a probability
distribution in each IS that forms player’s behavior strategy. Such an approach
seems to be more intuitive, especially considering the fact that a behavior strat-
egy is usually a natural way of perceiving a mixed strategy by humans. Unfor-
tunately, due to non-linear constraints, such a generalization poses problems for
sequence-form MILP methods.
The following subsection presents a solution that yields similar distortion to
the one described above while avoids non-linear constraints.
2.1 Sequence-Form based MILPs
A state-of-the-art approach to calculate SSE in sequential games [4] – referred
to as C2016 in this paper – is an iterative method which alternates two phases:
solving MILP/LP for finding Stackelberg Extensive-Form Correlated Equilib-
rium (SEFCE) in sequence-form game representation, and SEFCE refinement
with a dedicated procedure relying on LP modification towards SSE. Since the
equilibrium refinement part is not affected by the implementation of AT it will
not be discussed here. The SEFCE part of the method, defined by a set of
equations (2)-(8), is built around variables that define probabilities of playing
particular sequences by the players [4]. The following LP definition employs
the notion of relevant sequence pairs (rel) – formally introduced in Definition 3
of [4].
max
p,v
∑
σl∈Σl
∑
σf∈Σf
p(σl, σf )gl(σl, σf ) (2)
s.t. p(∅, ∅) = 1; 0 ≤ p(σl, σf ) ≤ 1 (3)
p(σl(I), σf ) =
∑
a∈A(I)
p(σl(I)a, σf ) ∀I ∈ Il,∀σf ∈rel(σl(I)) (4)
p(σl, σf (I)) =
∑
a∈A(I)
p(σl,σf (I)a) ∀I∈If ,∀σl∈rel(σf (I)) (5)
v(σf ) =
∑
σl∈rel(σf )
p(σl, σf )gf (σl, σf )
+
∑
I∈I|σf (I)=σf
∑
a∈Af (I)
v(σfa) ∀σf ∈ Σf (6)
v(I, σf ) ≥
∑
σl∈rel(σf )
p(σl, σf )gf (σl, σf (I)a)
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+
∑
I′∈If |σf (I′)=σf (I)a
v(I ′, σf ),
∀I ∈ If ,∀σf ∈
⋃
h∈I
rel(σl(h)),∀a ∈ A(I) (7)
v(σf (I)a) =v(I, σf (I)a)∀I ∈ If ,∀a ∈ A(I) (8)
The main variables in the above LP are p(σl, σf ) which describe the correlation
plan and represent probabilities that correlation device will give suggestion of
playing the respective sequences of moves (σl, σf ) by the players. Implicitly,
they define the resulting players’ strategies. Objective (2) maximizes leader’s
utility. Constraints (3) – (5) ensure that the correlation plan is correct, i.e. prob-
ability of playing a given sequence is a sum of probabilities of playing sequences
that are built from it by adding one action. v are auxiliary variables which guar-
antee that suggested σf is the best follower’s response. The crucial constraints
(from AT perspective) are (6) and (7) which assure that the selected follower’s
strategy would yield an outcome no worse than that of any other strategy. Im-
plementation of AT requires changing the perception of p(σl, σf ) variables so as
to include anchoring bias - the details are presented in the following section.
Solving the above LP is iteratively alternated with a refinement procedure
mentioned above. No modifications to this procedure, compared to its original
formulation [4], are required.
2.2 Anchoring Theory modification
ATSG is implemented as a distorted follower’s perception of the leader’s behav-
ior strategy. Let’s denote by q(i) a probability of choosing action i by the leader
in a given IS, stemming from its behavior strategy. The most straightforward
implementation of AT (though non-linear in sequence-form games) is to change
the probability of taking this action to q′(i) = (1 − αq(i)) + α/M , where M is
the number of actions available in this IS. However, in sequence-form games,
for a given leader’s sequence of actions σl = a1, a2, a3, . . . , an a probability of
playing it, based on behavior strategy, would be p(σl) = q(a1)q(a2) · · · q(an) and
the distorted AT probability would become
p′(σl) = ((1− α)q(a1) + α/M1)((1− α)q(a2) + α/M2) · · ·
((1− α)q(an) + α/Mn), (9)
where Mi is the number of actions available in IS in which ai is played.
Please observe that variables p in LP formulation (2)-(8) are products of
q(ai) values presented above (9), and as such cannot be expressed in a linear
form with respect to q(ai). Consequently, applying the above AT modification
to MILP (2)–(8) would end-up with non-linear constraints, inadequate for MILP
formulation.
Consequently, we propose to simplify the above ATSG by dropping distortion
coefficients from all but the last one probabilities:
p′′(σl) = q(a1)q(a2) · · · q(an−1)((1− α)qan + α/Mn)
= q(a1)q(a2) · · · q(an−1)·α/Mn + (1−α)q(a1)q(a2)· · ·q(an−1)q(an)
= p(init(σl))α/Mn + (1− α)p(σl), (10)
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where init(·) is a function which outputs a sequence without the last move. A
simplified version of ATSG (eq. (10)) is well suited to MILP/LP formulations
of sequence-form games.
Please note that relations among probabilities of the leader’s actions within a
single IS are the same according to both eqs. (9) and (10), i.e. ∀σ1l , σ2l I(σ1l ) =
I(σ2l )⇒ p′(σ1l )/p′(σ2l ) = p′′(σ1l )/p′′( σ2l ), where p′(σ), p′′(σ) denote probability of
sequence σ in a given IS calculated according to (9) and (10), resp. Furthermore,
for a given sequence σl, for small values of α a difference |p′′(σl)− p′(σl)| is also
small.
Please also note that the resulting p′′ values do not represent proper prob-
ability distribution since they do not sum up to one. Their normalization is
not needed though, as they are used only to make comparisons between dis-
torted utilities of various follower’s strategies. Results of such comparisons are
independent of p′′ normalization.
2.3 Modification of MILP/LP based methods
ATSG formulation (10) was incorporated into three state-of-the-art methods for
sequential SGs.
2.3.1 SEFCE method
In the first method [4], briefly summarized in section 2.1, ATSG is implemented
through modification of constraints (6) and (7), which are replaced by con-
straints (11) and (12) presented below:
v(σf ) =



XXXXXXXXXXXX
∑
σl∈rel(σf )
p(σl, σf )gf (σl, σf )
∑
σl∈rel(σf )
gf (σl, σf ) (p(σl, σf ) + α/MI · p(init(σl), σf )) +
+
∑
I∈I|σf (I)=σf
∑
a∈Af (I)
v(σfa) ∀σf ∈ Σf (11)
v(I, σf ) ≥
((((
((((
((((
((hhhhhhhhhhhhhh
∑
σl∈rel(σf )
p(σl, σf )gf (σl, σf (I)a)
∑
σl∈rel(σf )
gf (σl, σf (I)a) (p(σl, σf ) + α/MI · p(init(σl), σf )) +
+
∑
I′∈If |σf (I′)=σf (I)a
v(I ′, σf ),
∀I ∈ If ,∀σf ∈
⋃
h∈I
rel(σl(h)),∀a ∈ A(I) (12)
The above formulation is a result of application of eq. (10) to LP constraints.
Please observe that LP in C2016 does not contain variables describing prob-
abilities of playing σl alone (pσl), but refers to a correlation plan which provides
suggestions on the playing pairs (σf , σl). Moreover, p(σl, σf ) equals p(σl) only if
the correlation plan suggests the follower to play a pure strategy (i.e. marginal
probability p(σf ) ∈ {0, 1} (*)). In the above ATSG version of C2016, defined
by equations (11) -(12), conditions (*) may not initially hold for all σf , but
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must be all fulfilled at completion of C2016, since they constitute a stopping
condition of this method.
2.3.2 Game abstraction method
In 2018 a new approach to extensive-form SSGs that folds game subtrees into
nodes called gadgets and then incrementally unfolds them to refine the solu-
tion [5] was proposed. The method (henceforth referred to as CBK2018 ) inter-
nally employs C2016 to solve the abstracted (smaller) games. CBK2018 was
formulated by its authors in two variants: as an exact method and as a heuris-
tic time-optimized approach, with experimental evaluation provided only for
the latter variant [5]. Consequently, we also focus on heuristic formulation of
CBK2018 and following recommendation of the authors of [5] set the internal
method’s parameters to  = 0.3, σ = 0.4 which assures fast convergence, albeit
at the cost of some deviation from the optimal results. In ATSG modifica-
tion of CBK2018 original C2016 formulation is replaced with its ATSG version
(11)-(12).
2.3.3 Sequence-form method
The third MILP-based method for finding SE in sequential games considered in
this paper is an approach proposed in [2] (henceforth referred to as BC2015 ).
BC2015 directly utilizes sequence-form game representation and, unlike C2016,
is not an iterative method, i.e. relies on solving a single MILP instance to
obtain the game solution. Generally, its performance is expected to be worse
than C2016 due to the substantial number of integer variables in MILP (one
variable per each possible follower’s sequence of moves). Below, a modified
MILP which incorporates eq. (10) into BC2015 formulation is presented:
max
p,r,v,s
∑
z∈Z
p(z)ul(z), s.t. (13)
vIf (σf ) =sσf +
∑
I′∈If |σf (I′)=σf
vI′ +


XXXXXXXXX
∑
σl∈Σl
rl(σl)gf (σl, σf )+
∑
σl∈Σl
rl(σl)gf (σl, σf )+α/MI(σl)gf (σl, σf )rl(init(σl)) (14)
ri(∅) =1 ∀i ∈ N (15)
ri(σi) =
∑
a∈Ai(Ii)
ri(σia) ∀i ∈ N ∀Ii ∈ Ii, σi = σi(Ii) (16)
0 ≤sσf ≤ (1− rf (σf )) ·M ∀σf ∈ Σf (17)
0 ≤p(z) ≤ ri(σi(z)) ∀i ∈ N ∀z ∈ Z (18)
1 =
∑
z∈Z
p(z) (19)
rf (σf ) ∈ {0, 1} ∀σf ∈ Σf
0 ≤ rl(σl) ≤ 1 ∀σl ∈ Σl
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3 Heuristic Approximations of ATSG
The above three ATSG modifications of MILP/LP methods are compared with
two heuristic non-MILP approaches to solving sequential extensive-form SSG
with adequate ATSG adjustments.
3.1 A summary of O2UCT method
The first approach (referred to as O2UCT - double-oracle UCT sampling) [11,
13] relies on a guided sampling of the follower’s strategy space interleaved with
finding a feasible leader’s strategy using double-oracle method.
In the first step, a follower’s strategy (pirf ) is obtained using Upper Confidence
bound applied to Trees (UCT) algorithm [14] - a variant of guided Monte Carlo
sampling. Then, for the sampled follower’s strategy, a process of building the
leader’s strategy (δl) is performed. δl must satisfy the following conditions: (1)
pirf is the best response strategy against δl; (2) δl provides as high as possible
leader’s utility when played against the best follower’s response. An algorithm
of finding the requested leader’s strategy δl is outlined below and detailed in [13].
In the first step the best follower’s response (pibf ) is calculated (†) against
δl. Then the algorithm checks if the pi
b
f = pi
r
f . If so, then the procedure for
adjusting δl to obtain better utility against pi
b
f (compared to pi
r
f ) is applied (‡).
Otherwise, when pirf 6= pibf , an adjustment to δl is made so as to increase leader’s
utility against pirf .
The two above-mentioned phases: sampling of the follower’s strategy pirf
(against the current leader’s strategy δl) and adjustment of δl are iteratively
alternated in O2UCT.
3.1.1 ATSG implementation
ATSG implementation in O2UCT required two changes. In the follower’s best
response oracle (†), which works by exhaustive search of possible pure strategies
in O2UCT, the procedure that calculates follower’s utility was modified so as to
use distorted probabilities (10) when calculating the expected value. Similarly,
in the procedure that calculates a difference between follower’s utilities for two
strategies (‡), the way the expected utility is calculated was adapted so as to
use a distorted strategy (perceived by the follower in ATSG).
Please observe that in the case of O2UCT, contrary to MILP/LP ATSG im-
plementations, the potential existence of non-linearities in the formulas defining
distorted follower’s probabilities is not harmful, and - in principle - any other
BR modification could be used instead of eq. (10). For comparability reasons,
we will use a linear form (10) in the experiments.
3.2 A summary of EASG method
The other heuristic method applicable to sequential SGs considered in this pa-
per [34] utilizes EA to find the leader’s mixed strategy and, to our knowledge,
is the first generic evolutionary approach proposed in this domain. We are
aware of only one other application of EAs to solving sequential SGs [12] which,
however, is specifically designed to games on a plane with moving targets.
9
Algorithm 1: A pseudocode of EASG.
P - population
P ← randomly selected leader’s pure strategies
while (generations limit is not reached) do
E ← ne chromosomes with the highest fitness function values
Pc ⊆ P /* random population subset for crossover */
/* crossover merges pairs of chromosomes */
P = P ∪ Crossover(Pc)
Pm ⊆ P /* random population subset for mutation */
/* mutation changes actions in randomly selected element of a
chromosome */
P = (P \ Pm) ∪Mutation(Pm)
Evaluate(P) /* calculate fitness function value - the leader’s
payoff against the optimal follower’s response to a strategy
encoded in a chromosome */
P = E ∪ Selection(P) /* choose strategies for the next generation
based on fitness evaluation */
end
return best leader’s strategy
EASG follows a standard evolutionary algorithm scheme and is presented
in Algorithm 1. A population of individuals evolves for a fixed number of gen-
erations. In each generation crossover and mutation operators are applied with
certain probabilities, and then a population for the next generation is created
by selection procedure, based on fitness function value computed for each indi-
vidual.
Population. Each chromosome CHq, q = 1, . . . , population size represents
some leader’s mixed strategy in the form of a vector of pure strategies piqi with
their probabilities pqi :
CHq = {(piq1, pq1), . . . , (piqlq , p
q
lq
)},
lq∑
i=1
pqlq = 1,
where lq is the length of CHq. Strategy pi
q
i is a list of leader’s actions in consec-
utive rounds. Each chromosome in the initial population includes one randomly
selected pure strategy with probability equal to 1.
Crossover. A crossover operator combines two randomly chosen chromo-
somes by aggregating all pure strategies they contain and halving their proba-
bilities (if a given strategy belongs to both chromosomes, the resulting proba-
bilities are summed up). Crossover is applied to a chosen pair of chromosomes
with a certain probability.
Mutation. In mutation operation a pair (pure strategy, round number) is
uniformly selected in a chromosome. Then, starting from the selected round
until the last one, a leader’s action is uniformly chosen in each round (among
all actions available in this round) and added to a chromosome in place of the
existing action. Mutation affects each individual with a certain probability.
The role of mutation operation is to boost exploration of the leader’s strategy
space while crossover combines existing solutions and has more exploitation
nature.
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Selection. Chromosomes are selected to the next generation through a binary
tournament with a certain selection pressure P , i.e. among two randomly chosen
chromosomes the higher-fitted one is promoted with probability P and the lower-
fitted one with 1− P . ne individuals (called elite) from the current population
with the highest fitness values are directly promoted to the next generation
population (unconditionally).
Evaluation. The fitness function is defined as the leader’s utility obtained
when playing a strategy encoded by a chromosome. This utility is calculated by
computing game payoffs against all possible follower’s strategies and choosing
the one that yields the highest value for the follower, while breaking ties in favor
of the leader (SSE condition).
3.2.1 ATSG implementation
Similarly to O2UCT, an important advantage of EASG formulation is its flex-
ibility, understood as the ease of adaptation to various SG formulations. In
the context of BR various types of perturbations to the optimal follower’s re-
sponse can be implemented in EASG by adjusting the chromosome evaluation
procedure.
Incorporation of ATSG into EASG relies on considering a distorted version
of the leader’s mixed strategy when calculating the best follower’s response.
This distorted leader’s strategy is obtained in the three following steps.
1. First, in order to directly apply eq. (10), a strategy encoded by a chromo-
some is transformed to the form of a tree.
Formally, let’s denote by Ppref (σ) a sum of probabilities of all pure strategies in
the chromosome with prefix σ. A probability of an edge in a game tree between
nodes corresponding to init(σ) and σ is computed as
Ppref (σl)
Ppref (init(σl))
.
2. Then, all probabilities in this tree are modified according to eq. (10).
3. Finally, the tree (with changed probabilities) is transformed back to a list
of pure strategies with assigned probabilities through a reversed procedure.
Technically, each pure strategy in the resultant chromosome is created based on
a unique path in the tree, from the root to a leaf node, and its probability is
equal to the product of probabilities of all edges on that path. This way, the
best follower’s response strategy is obtained.
Next, this follower’s response is used to calculate players’ utilities, but this
time using original, unmodified strategy from a chromosome (without distortion
of probabilities).
In other words, a distorted strategy is used only in calculation of the fol-
lower’s utility. The leader’s strategy is assumed to be perfectly rational and
therefore their utility (chromosome fitness value) is calculated with no distor-
tion.
Similarly to O2UCT, instead of eq. (10), the non-linear form of ATSG de-
scribed in section 2.2 could be used as well. For the sake of comparison with
MILP/LP methods a simplified linear ATSG formulation is considered.
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(a) An example of a warehouse layout:
narrow black path denotes the main cor-
ridor, squares are storage spaces. Room
numbers correspond to vertex labels in
the resulting game graph presented in the
right figure.
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(b) A corresponding game graph. Rect-
angular vertices are targets, a triangle
vertex is attacker’s starting point, a blue
shaded circle vertex is defender’s starting
point.
Figure 1: An example Warehouse Game. Values in the right figure denote
payoffs for the attacker and the defender, resp. in the case of an interception of
the attacker in a given vertex. Additional utilities, in case of a successful attack,
are assigned in targets (the second column). All games are defined on a 4 × 4
grid.
4 Experimental evaluation
In what follows the ATSG versions of all five considered methods will be referred
to with prefix AT-, i.e. AT-C2016, AT-CBK2018, AT-BC2015, AT-O2UCT and
AT-EASG, resp.
4.1 Benchmark games
Experimental evaluation was performed on a set of benchmark Warehouse Games
introduced in [10] (all game instances were downloaded from the website [16]).
Each game resembles a situation of patrolling a warehouse building. The game
area is modeled in the form of a graph with some vertices containing valuable
resources (referred to as targets). There are two players in a game: a defender
and an attacker. Each player possesses a single unit, located in one of the ver-
tices (warehouse spaces). In each round, each unit can either stay in a currently
occupied vertex or move to an adjacent one (change the room). If the units
meet in a common vertex an interception occurs and the defender receives a
reward (positive utility value) while the attacker receives a penalty (negative
utility). If the attacker reaches any of the target vertices (rooms) without being
intercepted by the defender, he/she is rewarded and the defender is penalized.
In either of the above cases the game ends. Otherwise the game is played a
fixed number of rounds T . Once the round limit T is reached, both players are
assigned a neutral utility of 0.
The benchmark set consists of 25 games generated on 4×4 grid, with general-
sum utilities. An example game layout created by a warehouse generator is
presented in Figure 1a (this is an auxiliary game representation). The corre-
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sponding game graph (the actual game representation) is depicted in Figure 1b.
A detailed description of the game generator settings is presented in [10]. In this
paper games with T = 3, . . . , 7 are considered, albeit for T = 7 exact methods
were unable to compute solutions within allotted time and memory.
4.2 Experimental setup
For each game instance (game layout and game length) AT-O2UCT and AT-
EASG were run 10 times and for each other (deterministic) MILP method a
single trial was performed.
Tests were run on Intel Xeon Silver 4116 @ 2.10GHz with 256GB RAM.
Experiments with AT-O2UCT and AT-EASG were run in parallel, each with
8GB RAM assigned. Tests with AT-C2016, AT-CBK2018, AT-BC2015 were
run sequentially with all 256GB RAM available in each trial. All tests were lim-
ited to 200 hours (per single test) and were forcibly terminated if not completed
within the allotted time.
Performance of both heuristic methods was analyzed in two dimensions:
quality of results (an expected leader’s payoff) and time efficiency. Results for
all games were merged based on the number of game nodes of an extensive-form
game. This grouping followed formula (20) presented below:
bucket = 10round(log10 |H|), (20)
where round rounds a number to the nearest integer. Consequently, test games
were grouped by the orders of magnitude of the respective numbers of game
nodes. Such a grouping combines two aspects of game complexity: the un-
derlying game graph structure and the game length. In the rest of the paper
Bi, i = 2, . . . , 7 will denote the i-th bucket of games, i.e. the one which contains
all games for which round(log10 |H|) = i. In order to streamline the notation,
we will denote by B≥i, i = 2, . . . , 7 the union of buckets Bi, Bi+1, . . . , B7 and
by B≤i, i = 2, . . . , 7 the union of buckets B2, B3, . . . Bi.
The AT-BC2015 method (likewise BC2015 [2]) is parameterless. In AT-
C2016 the SI-LP variant of C2016 [4] is considered. For AT-CBK2018, the fast
converging variant of CBK2018 [5] (with  = 0.3 and σ = 0.4) is implemented.
AT-O2UCT is parameterized by the following 3 stopping conditions (cf. Fig.
4 in [13]): Either a maximum number of executions of the positive pass (step
† in the figure) exceeds 5 000, or an improvement of the leader’s payoff in 500
subsequent iterations is less than 10−5, or a number of subsequent executions
of the feasibility pass (step ‡ in the figure) without going to positive pass (step
†) exceeds 10 000 (infeasible strategy).
In AT-EASG the following values for the steering parameters are selected:
population size - 30, mutation probability - 0.5, crossover probability - 0.8,
selection pressure P = 0.9, the number of elitist chromosomes - ne = 2. The
algorithm is run either for 1 000 generations or until no improvement of the
leader’s strategy is observed in 20 subsequent generations (whichever occurs
first).
Parameters for the last two methods were selected based on a limited number
of preliminary simulations.
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Figure 2: The average expected leader’s utility.
4.3 Payoffs
The average expected utilities of the leader obtained by each method are pre-
sented in Fig. 2. Since both AT-C2016 and AT-BC2015 are exact methods
their results are clearly the highest and the respective plots overlap. Both non-
MILP heuristic methods perform slightly worse, although AT-EASG is a close
runner-up for games from B≤5, in which range it outperforms AT-O2UCT.
For the largest games, from B7, the best-performing method is AT-O2UCT,
which excels AT-EASG (the only remaining competitor) by a clear margin.
None of the two exact MILP methods were capable of solving games of this size
(belonging to B7) and the approximate MILP approach (AT-CBK2018 ) solved
16 game instances and failed in solving the remaining 9. Consequently, for the
sake of fair comparison, the results of AT-CBK2018 are not presented for the
largest games.
Generally speaking AT-CBK2018 yields the weakest outcomes across the
entire range of game sizes and its performance deteriorates along with increasing
game complexity.
4.4 Time scalability
Fig. 3 presents time scalability of the methods. While all of them scale ex-
ponentially, the running times of both non-MILP approaches grow at slower
paces. For games from B≥6 (AT-EASG) and from B≥7 (AT-O2UCT ), resp.
they already excel both exact MILP methods.
On the other hand, it shouldn’t be forgotten that the main asset of AT-C2016
and AT-BC2015 is convergence to the optimal solution and therefore a com-
parison of their running times with heuristic approaches needs to be considered
with care.
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that beyond certain level of
game complexity the exact methods become infeasible and, in such scenarios,
both heuristic approaches present a viable alternative.
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The third MILP method is a state-of-the-art algorithm for approximate solv-
ing extensive-form games. Following a recommendation from [5] AT-CBK2018
was parameterized in a way which assures fast convergence ( = 0.3, σ = 0.4) so
as to make a fair time comparison with the remaining two heuristic methods. It
can be concluded from Fig. 3 that for the set of most complex games AT-EASG
and AT-O2UCT are faster than AT-CBK2018, at the same time providing much
better leader’s payoffs (cf. Fig. 2).
Please note that since AT-CBK2018 solved only 16 games from B7, the
solution times for the remaining game instances were capped at the limit of
200h, which was in favor of AT-CBK2018 (in comparison with AT-O2UCT and
AT-EASG) since both heuristic methods solved all 25 largest games within the
allotted time (hence, in their case the actual times are reported).
4.5 Stability of AT-O2UCT and AT-EASG
While both non-MILP methods proved efficient in both time scalability and
returned payoffs, one of the interesting observations from Fig. 2 is deterioration
of the average payoffs obtained by AT-EASG for the largest games (from B≥6).
Apparently, along with further increasing of games’ complexity the variance of
AT-EASG results also increases. In particular, for two game instances from
the considered benchmark set [16] (smallbuilding-89-6 and smallbuilding-89-7 )
standard deviations of results equaled nearly 0.26 which had a visible impact
on the average payoffs. Figure 4 compares the average standard deviations
(stddev.) for AT-EASG and AT-O2UCT. Clearly, for games from B≥6 AT-
EASG stddev. increases, while stddev. of AT-O2UCT remains approximately
on the same level. In terms of stability, AT-O2UCT appears to have a clear
advantage over AT-EASG.
On the other hand, despite high variance, AT-EASG is still able to obtain
very good solutions, with the best ones practically equal to those of AT-O2UCT.
Figure 5 shows both the average and maximum payoffs of both methods. Dotted
curves (which represent the maximum payoff averaged across all benchmark
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games from a given bucket) are very close to each other and the differences
between the best solutions found by AT-O2UCT and AT-EASG are below 10−2
for each bucket.
5 Conclusions
This work considers the SG formulation in which the follower is not perfectly
rational. Such a setting is motivated by the real SG scenarios in which humans,
when performing the role of the follower, are prone to certain inefficiencies in
perception and assessment of the leader’s strategy. A particular implementation
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of the follower’s bounded rationality considered in this paper refers to Anchor-
ing Theory [28]. AT assumes the existence of a certain distortion (towards the
uniform distribution of probabilities of possible actions) of the follower’s per-
ception of the leader’s mixed strategy. The leader being aware of that distortion
can exploit this weakness in their strategy formulation.
The paper proposes an efficient MILP-suitable formulation of AT in the
context of sequential extensive-form SGs. This formulation (ATSG) is imple-
mented in three state-of-the-art MILP methods – two exact ones: BC2015 [2]
and C2016 [4] and one approximate: CBK2018 [5], as well as in two heuristic
non-MILP approaches: O2UCT [11, 13] and EASG [34].
Experimental results on a set of 25 games show that non-MILP methods
provide optimal or close-to-optimal leader’s payoffs while being visibly faster
than exact MILP approaches. At the same time, they clearly outperform time-
optimized approximate MILP method in both payoffs quality and time efficiency.
An additional asset of non-MILP solutions in the context of BR is their flexi-
bility, stemming from virtually no restrictions imposed on the form in which BR
is represented. Unlike MILP methods which require a linear form of BR related
constraints, non-MILP solutions allow the implementation of more complex,
non-linear BR formulations.
Our current focus is on verification of the efficacy of proposed AT formulation
in experiments that involve human players in the role of the follower. To this
end for a selection of Warehouse Games the following leader’s strategies will be
precomputed: (a) SSE strategy (rational, not distorted), (b) ATSG SSE strategy
and (c) a strategy stemming from eq. (9) approximated by AT-EASG or AT-
O2UCT, respectively. In each game, a human participant will play the follower’s
role against (randomly assigned) one of the above strategies. A comparison of
the average leader’s payoffs in case (a) vs (b) and (c) will indicate whether
potential distortions of SSE can, in fact, provide any advantage for the leader,
stemming from the fact that the role of the follower is indeed played by a human.
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